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First of all, this paper explores the rationale for internal party democracy, highlighting the 'school for democracy' argument. Second, it identifies three crucial processes as determinants for the level of intra-party democracy; a democratic process for the election of leaders, for the formulation of policies and for coalition making. The first is emphasized. Third, the quality of intra-party democracy in Bangladesh is analysed in terms of party leadership selection and the prevalent practice of dynastic rule. The overall finding is that the degree of internal democracy of political parties in Bangladesh is weak, due to the electoral parties' weak organizations, strong centralization and prevalent informal decision-making processes controlled by a limited number of party elites (dynastic parties). This general result has important implications regarding the prospects of democratizing party politics and consolidating democracy in Bangladesh.

Dynastic politics, usually presumed to be the antithesis of democracy, is a routine aspect of politics in many modern democracies. This book introduces a new theoretical perspective on dynasticism in democracies, using original data on twenty-first-century Indian parliaments. It argues that the roots of dynastic politics lie at least in part in modern democratic institutions - states and parties - which give political families a leg-up in the electoral process. It also proposes a rethinking of the view that dynastic politics is a violation of democracy, showing that it can also reinforce some aspects of democracy while violating others. Finally, this book suggests that both reinforcement and violation are the products, not of some property intrinsic to political dynasties, but of the institutional environment from which those dynasties emerge.

Kanchan Chandra. (Ed.), Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. 2016. 279 pages. ₹495.

The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labelled "pro-democratic dynasties", show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on July 10, 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress

We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the self-perpetuation of political elites, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We find that the percentage of dynastic legislators is decreasing over time and that dynastic legislators have been significantly more prevalent in the South, the Senate and the Democratic party. While regional and party differences have largely disappeared over time, the difference across chambers has not. We document differences and similarities in the profile and political careers of dynastic politicians relative to the rest of legislators. We also find that legislators that enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person.s political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. Finally, we find that increases in political competition are associated with fewer dynastic legislators, suggesting that dynastic politicians may be less valued by voters.

The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labeled "pro-democratic dynasties," show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on 10 July 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians.

What is the effect of political dynasties on effective governance? To determine whether dynastic presence has a positive or detrimental effect on good governance, we examined the Philippine House of Representatives, an institution where more than 60% of its members have been dominated by such clans since the restoration of democracy in 1987. Specifically, we test whether provinces dominated by such established families are more likely to bring higher levels of pork barrel allocations to their provinces. The findings show how provinces dominated by family clans are less likely to experience good governance in terms of (a) infrastructure development, (b) spending on health, (c) the prevalence of criminality, (d) full employment, and (e) the overall quality of government. The implications of the empirical analyses convey that political dynasties have deleterious effects in terms of the allocation of public goods, even if their presence induces higher levels of congressional earmarks.

The article analyzes the political status and the dynasty of India's United Progressive Alliance, the roles of opposition parties such as the National Democratic Alliance and the "Third Front", and the overall democratic normalization process. The author examines the voting process in India and demographical statistics behind the elections during 2009. Also, examined are the congress party's comeback and the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty; a view into how political thinking affects the voters in India, and political trends created over the past four decades. Finally, the author examines the policies and points of the newly elected government and a view into the infrastructure and cabinet, looking at the future and its effects on India. Adapted from the source document.

peer-reviewed ; This thesis proposes an electoral system-based explanation for the observable variations in the rate of family following in the parliaments of mature, developed, democratic states. Electoral systems that foster intra-party competition for votes from the general public are held to incentivise the creation of personal political machines. Such machines are heritable and it is this inheritance that conveys significant advantages to the relatives of former MPs who follow them into elected office. A theory of dynasty formation and a new ranking of electoral systems according to the degree to which they incentivise the creation and maintenance of personal political machines are developed. These are tested against recent elections in seven countries and against the last eleven elections in Ireland. The results support the thesis and lead to a series of recommendations for electoral system reform.

The presence of dynasties seems to run counter to widely held conceptions of democratic opportunity and fairness. Yet they persist throughout the modern democratized world. Looking at the institutional change in Japan's party system as a comparative model, Daniel M. Smith examines the factors that contribute to their development over time and space and the advantages that members of dynasties reap throughout their political careers

Fil: Rossi, Martín A. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. ; I explore the causes of the existence of political dynasties in democratic societies. In particular, I investigate the causal relationship between tenure length and posterior dynastic success. Since tenure length is potentially endogenous in a model of political dynasties, I exploit a natural experiment in Argentina that provides a source of exogenous variation for tenure length. I find that having a longer tenure in Congress increases the probability of having a relative in future congresses. I also find that dynastic legislators have lower performance than non-dynastic legislators.